In the paper we consider the classical logicism program restricted to first-order logic. The main result of this paper is the proof of the theorem, which contains the necessary and sufficient conditions for a mathematical theory to be reducible to logic. Those and only those theories, which don't impose restrictions on the size of their domains, can be reduced to pure logic.
Logicism
As we know the main idea of logicism was that mathematics was an extension of logic and was reducible to logic by appropriate definitions.
One of the explications of logicism might look like if you are given a theory T with the set of postulates Ax. It is required to find such a set of logical definitions DF of mathematical notions of the theory T that for every formula B ∈ L T holds:
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As we know the attempt to implement the program of classical logicism has failed. It needs the higher-order logic, and far from intuitively obvious axioms: reducibility, multiplicativity (choice) and infinity, which can hardly be called logical. This was a major rebuke to the logicism.
It is interesting to find an answer to the more specific question:
To what limits classical logicism program can be implemented in the first-order predicate logic?
Defining new predicate symbols
We assume that the language of first-order predicate calculus is defined in the standard way as the set of terms and formulas over the signature Σ, which consists of nonlogical relational and functional symbols. We write L(Σ) for the first-order language over signature Σ. A first-order theory in the language L(Σ) is a set of logical axioms and non-logical postulates closed by derivability. Predicate calculus is the first-order theory with the empty set of non-logical postulates. We consider equality axioms as non-logical postulates.
We can extend the language of a theory by definitions of new predicate symbols, which have the following form:
The definition must satisfy the conditions:
A ∈ L(Σ).
3. The variables x 1 , . . . , x n are pairwise distinct.
The set of free variables of
The newly defined predicate symbol P must be added to the signature Σ. As the result, there is a transition from the language L(Σ) to the language L(Σ ∪ {P }).
In the language of the first order predicate calculus, we can define the universal n-ary predicate U n by the following definition:
The definition allows us to prove DU ⊢ ∀x 1 
This example is interesting because in the right part of the definition we use an arbitrary predicate symbol of the signature of the first order predicate calculus, but with the help of it, we define the specific predicate symbol with the specific properties.
As another example, we can give a definition of a symmetric relation. Let B be an arbitrary predicate symbol of the signature. We accept the following definition:
Let us show that DS 1 ⊢ ∀xy(S 1 xy ⊃ S 1 yx). There is another way to define a symmetric relation:
Let us show that DS 2 ⊢ ∀xy(S 2 xy ⊃ S 2 yx). These examples motivate us to find the general criterion of definability of the specific predicates with the help of predicate logic. Definition 1. The first-order theory T in a language L(Σ) with finite set of non-logical axioms Ax is definitionally embeddable into predicate calculus if and only if there are a signature Σ ′ and a set of definitions DT of symbols Σ \ Σ ′ by formulas of L(Σ ′ ) which met the following condition:
This definition is some variant of the notion of definitional embeddability of theories, which was proposed by V.A. Smirnov in [2] , [3, p. 65].
Auxiliary lemmas
To formulate the main theorem, we need to define function π, which translates formulas of first-order theories into formulas of the propositional logic. This function simply "erases" all terms and quantifiers in formulas.
Definition 2.
π(¬A) = ¬π(A).

π(A ▽ B) = π(A) ▽ π(B), where ▽ ∈ {&, ∨, ⊃, ≡}.
4. π(ΣxA) = π(A), where Σ ∈ {∀, ∃}. Lemma 1. Let v be some truth-value assignment to propositional variables that is in the standard way extended to all formulas of propositional logic, then the next statements are true:
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Proof.
(A) We prove the statement by structural induction. The basis of induction is the condition of the lemma∀g[M,
So we have to prove the induction step.
-from 6 by definition π
-from 10 by definition π
-from 5, 7 10. M, g C -from 6, 8 11. M, g B&C -from 9, 10 by definition
-from 3, 6 8. contradiction -5, 7 9. M, g ∀xB -from 4, 8
Since all logical connectives and the existential quantifier are definable through {¬, &, ∀} , the part (A) of the lemma is proved. 
Proof.
(⇒) Suppose, π(Ax) is consistent. It follows that there is the truthvalue assignment v to propositional variables, at which all the formulas π(Ax) are true.
Suppose that D is a non-empty set of individuals. We define the function of interpretation I of nonlogical language symbols in the set D. Let us choose an element e of the set D. 
Let us show that in the model M = ⟨D, I⟩ holds M Ax.
According to the constructed model,∀g[M, g P i (t) ⇔ v(π(P i ))]. From the Lemma 1 we obtain M A ⇔ v(π(A)). Because for all A ∈ Ax holds v(π(A)) = T rue, so we have M A.
(⇐) The proof is trivial, since the consistency of π(Ax) follows from the existence of a one-element model M = ⟨{a} , I⟩. 
The main theorem
The following theorem is a stronger form of the theorem proved in [1] .
Theorem 1. Let T be a first-order theory in a language L(Σ) with a finite set of closed non-logical postulates
Ax = {A 1 , . . . , A k }.
(A) T is definitionally embeddable into the first-order predicate calculus if and only if the set of formulas {π(
A 1 ), . . . , π(A k )} is logically consistent.
(B) T is definitionally embeddable into the first-order predicate calculus if and only if it does not impose any restrictions on the power of models.
(A) (⇐) We must prove that if the set of formulas {π(A 1 ), . . . , π(A k )} is logically consistent then the theory T is definitionally embeddable into the first order predicate calculus. Take the signature Σ ′ which satisfes the two conditions:
• We associate the definition with each predicate symbol P i ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P m } by the following rule: 
In each case P i is interpreted as R i and therefore M Ax.
For each P i we have one of the following two subcases:
For all atomic formulas P i ( ⃗ t) and all assignments g to individual variables we have M, g
The value of the atomic formula P i ( ⃗ t) doesn't depend on the particular assignments of values to individual variables. As a result, according to Lemma With the help of the completeness theorem of the first-order predicate calculus, we obtain DT ⊢ Ax. We can extend the model M = ⟨D, I⟩ to the model M ′ = ⟨D, I ′ ⟩ in which all the formulas of DT will be true. It is sufficient to expand the domain of the function I so that the new function of interpretation I ′ ascribed value I ′ (R i ) = I(P i ) to a predicate symbol R i , and for all other functional and predicate symbols retained the same values as I.
Since
It follows that all the formulas DT are true in the model M ′ . Therefore by our assumption DT B it must be M ′ B. However, the formula B doesn't contain symbols R 1 , . . . , R m , while all the other descriptive symbols are interpreted in the same way as in the model M , and by assumption it must be M ′ , g B. We have obtained a contradiction. Therefore, the assumption that Ax B does not hold is false.
(A) (⇒) We must prove that if a theory T is definitionally embeddable into first-order predicate calculus, then the set of formulas
Take an arbitrary one-element model M = ⟨{a} , I⟩ for signature Σ ′ . For each predicate symbol P i ∈ Σ \ Σ ′ , if it was introduced by definition P i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≡ D, we expand the domain of the interpretation function I as follows:
Note that since the domain of individuals consists of only one element, the function assigning values to individual variables, too, is the only one, and, consequently, predicate symbol P i will be interpreted as either empty set ∅, or singleton {⟨a, . . . . , a⟩}.
Performing this operation with all the new predicate symbols, we obtain the model M ′ = ⟨{a} , I ′ ⟩, in which all the definitions of the set DT will be true.
Since we assumed that Ax ⊢ B ⇔ DT ⊢ B, then every axiom A i ∈ {A 1 , . . . , A k } is derivable from DT . With the help of the completeness theorem of first-order predicate calculus, we obtain DT A i . It means that there is at least one one-element model of the theory T , and hence, the set {π(A 1 ), . . . , π(A k )} is logically consistent.
(B) The second part of the theorem follows from the part (A) and Lemma 2. 
Conclusion
The main theorem of this article can be considered as a solution of the classical logicism program for first-order theories. Those and only those theories which don't impose any restrictions on the power of their models can be reduced to pure logic. Among of such theories we can mention the elementary theory of groups, the theory of combinators (combinatory logic), the elementary theory of topoi and many others.
